ABSTRACT With the smart grid (SG) and the social Internet of Things (SIoT), an electric vehicle operator can use reliable, flexible, and efficient charging service with vehicle-to-grid (V2G). However, open channels can be vulnerable to various attacks by a malicious adversary. Therefore, secure mutual authentication for V2G has become essential, and numerous related protocols have been proposed. In 2018, Shen et al. proposed a privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT to ensure security. However, we demonstrate that their protocol does not withstand impersonation, privileged-insider, and offline password guessing attacks, and it does not also guarantee secure mutual authentication, session key security, and perfect forward secrecy. Therefore, this paper proposes a dynamic privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT to resolve the security weaknesses of Shen et al.'s protocol. The proposed protocol resists several attacks including impersonation, offline password guessing, man-in-the-middle, replay, and trace attacks, ensures anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, session key security, and secure mutual authentication. We evaluate the security of the proposed protocol using formal security analysis under the broadly-accepted real-or-random (ROR) model, secure mutual authentication proof using the widely-accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, informal (non-mathematical) security analysis, and also the formal security verification using the broadly-accepted automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) tool. We then compare computation costs, and security and functionality features of the proposed protocol with related protocols. Overall, the proposed protocol provides superior security, and it can be efficiently deployed to practical SIoT-based V2G environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advances in Internet of Things (IoT) technologies and widespread use of social networks, users can easily access convenient services using Social Internet of Things (SIoT) technologies. SIoT is the convergence of IoT technologies and social networking [1] , [2] , and it interconnects social relationships with other IoT devices. IoT devices collect and analyze data for various purposes, and can freely
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exchange data with users and other devices. Hence, SIoT can be efficiently applied to various fields, including smart healthcare, smart factory, smart grids, etc.
A smart grid is an advanced technology that improves conventional power grid reliability, flexibility and efficiency. Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) network [3] , in particular, is an interesting emerging smart grid technology, providing many advantages to smart grids, including renewable energy generation, solving electrical losses, and providing fast electricity supply. However, despite providing these advantages, concerns remain regarding V2G security and privacy due to their general vulnerabilities whereby an adversary can obtain an electric vehicle (EV) owner's location, sensitive information, and exchanged messages. Thus, V2G privacy, integrity and confidentiality must be guaranteed to provide safe and efficient services.
Kempton and Tomic [4] proposed the V2G network concept with numerous V2G concepts subsequently proposed [5] - [10] and many studies investigating V2G security issues [11] - [15] . In 2011, Stegelmann and Kesdogan [11] proposed an anonymity-preserving method using an adversary algorithm, and a privacy-preserving mechanism for the EV location [12] . In 2012, Liu et al. [13] proposed an improved location-preserving mechanism to enhance EV privacy. In 2013, Nicanfar et al. [14] proposed robust authentication for communication between EV and power station to ensure customer privacy. In 2014, Rottondi et al. [15] proposed privacy-preserving and privacy-friendly V2G infrastructure.
Many previous studies considered for V2G and IoT authentication protocols to ensure user privacy, including location, payment, and sensitive data [16] - [21] . In 2011, Yang et al. [16] proposed a secure communication protocol using blind signatures to guarantee secure communication. However, Yang et al. ' s protocol was vulnerable to key escrow attacks. In 2014 and 2015, Choi et al. [17] proposed security enhanced user authentication for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Wang et al. [18] proposed a traceable privacy-preserving protocol using bilinear pairing. However, both these protocols have high computational overheads and cannot be applied to practical V2G systems. Abdallah and Shen [19] , Liu et al. [20] , Fouda et al. [21] , and Shen et al. [22] proposed lightweight authentication protocols for V2G and smart grids to reduce computation costs. However, the protocols [19] and [20] only use an informal approach to analyze the security of their protocols, and [21] focused on V2G structures. In 2018, Shen et al. [22] proposed a practical lightweight authentication protocol for V2G in SIoT to overcome these issues, and claimed the proposed protocol could prevent impersonation, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks, while also achieving perfect forward secrecy and secure mutual authentication. However, we demonstrate that Shen et al. ' s protocol does not prevent impersonation and offline password guessing attacks, and it does not achieve perfect forward secrecy, session key security, and secure mutual authentication. Therefore, we propose a more secure dynamic privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT that resolves these security issues.
A. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions of the work are as follows.
• We show that Shen et al. ' s proposed protocol does not guarantee security, being vulnerable to impersonation and offline password guessing attacks and it does not also achieve secure mutual authentication and secure key agreement.
• We propose a dynamic privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT to overcome problems of Shen et al. ' s protocol. The proposed protocol prevents impersonation, offline password guessing and trace attacks, and guarantees secure mutual authentication, key agreement, anonymity, untraceability and session key security.
• We show that the proposed protocol achieves secure mutual authentication and session key security using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [23] and the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model, respectively. In addition, we also perform informal analysis to show its security against other potential attacks.
• We simulated the proposed protocol for formal security verification using the ''Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool''.
• A detailed comparative study reveals that the performances for the proposed scheme is superior than other related existing protocols.
B. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the necessary background to discuss the proposed protocol. Section III presents the general V2G network system model. Sections IV and V review and cryptanalyze Shen et al.'s protocol, respectively. Sections VI and VII propose a dynamic privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT and its security analysis, respectively. Sections VII-C and VIII perform simulation analysis to prove the proposed protocol security and performance analysis comparison with related protocols, respectively. Finally, Section IX summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the treat model, and other relevant mathematical preliminaries including the fuzzy extractor used in this paper.
A. THREAT MODEL
This paper uses the broadly-accepted ''Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model'' [24] to analyze protocol security. Under the DY model, a malicious attacker can delete, inject, modify or eavesdrop messages transmitted over the Internet. Apart from these capabilities of the attacker, we assume the following:
• A malicious attacker can obtain or steal a mobile device from legitimate users, and can then extract values stored in the smart card or mobile device using the power analysis attacks [25] , [26] .
• A malicious attacker can be a legal user (privilegedinsider user) in the system or an outsider, and can attempt various attacks using obtained data [27] , [28] .
Apart from the DY threat model, we also consider the CK-adversary model [29] , which is a more stronger threat model and it is treated as the current de facto standard in modeling key-exchange protocols [30] . Under the CK-adversary VOLUME 7, 2019 model, the attacker can compromise secure information like session state, private and session keys in addition to his/her all capabilities under the DY model. Hence, the key-exchange protocols should assure that in the event of ephemeral (short-term) secret leakage, the effect on the security of session keys established among the communicating entities in an authenticated key-exchange protocol should be minimal [31] . We also follow the following assumptions as stated in Amin et al.'s scheme [33] . The registered legal users always use the words as passwords and identities from the dictionary available to the adversary A in the password based user authentication protocols. The password and identity of a legal user can be individually guessed by A. However, guessing both password and identity of a registered user and then verifying those in polynomial time is a computationally infeasible task for A when the right procedures are adopted (e.g., by not choosing an easy-to-guess password and identity pair). Furthermore, it is also computationally infeasible for A to guess the secret keys and random numbers (nonces) in polynomial time as these are high entropy entities.
B. FUZZY EXTRACTOR
The fuzzy extractor [32] is a data extraction technique from user biometric data. Biometric data acquisition commonly suffers from recording different values from reality due to various noises. The fuzzy extractor resolves this problem and can uniformly extract a random bit string without noise. Fuzzy extractor procedures are detailed elsewhere [32] , [34] , but it is based on generation and reproduction processes (Gen and Rep), respectively).
• Gen is a ''probabilistic algorithm'' that calculates biometric secret data (key) b i ∈ M , where M = {0, 1} l is a finite l-dimensional metric. After receiving the input biometrics BIO i , Gen uniformly outputs a random bit string b i , called the biometric secret key and a public reproduction parameter τ i .
• Rep is a ''deterministic algorithm'' that recovers biometric secret key b i ∈ M from inputted noisy biometrics BIO i and reproduction parameter τ i as 
C. ONE-WAY CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION
Cryptographic one-way hash functions are designed in such a way that they are highly sensitive to even slight perturbations to the input strings. Formally, a ''collision-resistant one-way hash function'' can be defined as follows [36] . 
III. V2G SYSTEM MODEL
This section introduces the V2G system model and networks. V2G networks incorporate three entities: power grid, EV and charging station, and aggregator (AGT), as shown in Figure 1 . A V2G network collects EV battery data and provides efficient power management services. The EV and charging station send monitoring data, such as charging record, payment record, battery status, etc. to the AGT; the AGT collects these data and estimates EV total electricity capacity in the power grid; and the power grid provides electricity to the EV with reasonable price. Figure 2 shows the authentication process in SIoT based V2G environments to ensure user privacy, such as identity, battery, and payment records. The proposed system incorporates three parties: trusted third party (TTP), EV, and AGT. The EV first registers its identity to TTP, and then TTP issues a smart card for the EV and deploys the aggregator. When EV wants to access the V2G system, it performs the login and key agreement procedure to ensure message confidentiality and privacy. After achieving secure mutual authentication between EV and AGT, AGT performs key confirmation and updating to check correct session key distribution and synchronization. Finally, AGT sends feedback to TTP.
IV. REVIEW OF SHEN ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
This section reviews Shen et al.'s key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT. Their proposed protocol comprises three phases: 1) registration, 2) login and key agreement, and 3) key confirmation and pseudonym update. Table 1 shows the notations used in this paper.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
The EV 's owner, EVO i , registers EV i to the TTP to enable smart grid services. Figure 3 shows the registration phase for Shen et al.'s protocol, with detailed steps as follows.
Step Step 2: The smart card computes A ||k i ). After successful completing login and key agreement, EV i must continuously confirm the key and update the pseudonym to ensure user privacy and check the session key distribution between EV i and AGT is correct.
C. KEY CONFIRMATION AND PSEUDONYM UPDATE PHASE
EV i updates its pseudonymous identity PID i to guarantee user privacy and prevent desynchronization attacks. This process also checks message transmission and successful session key distribution. Figure 5 shows the key confirmation and pseudonym update processes for Shen et al.'s protocol, with detailed steps as follows.
Step 1: After login and key agreement, EV i calculates 
V. CRYPTANALYSIS OF SHEN ET AL.'S PROTOCOL
This section highlights various security flaws in Shen et al.'s protocol. Shen et al. claimed their proposed protocol was secure against impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks, and achieved perfect forward security. However, we prove that Shen et al.'s protocol is not secure against the following attacks.
A. IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Section II-A introduces the threat model to analyze the security of the protocol proposed in this paper. Suppose that an attacker U at can obtain the smart card of legal user EVO i and intercept messages transmitted in previous and current sessions. Further, suppose U at obtains the values
, r i } stored in the smart card using the power VOLUME 7, 2019 analysis attacks [25] , [26] . Finally, U at performs impersonation attack using the following detailed steps.
Step 1: U at generates a random number k at , and computes 
C. PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In this attack, we assume that a privileged-insider user of the TTP, being an insider attacker, say A has the registration information {SPW i , PID i , ID i , FPA i } that were supplied by the legal registered user EVO i during the registration process of Shen et al.'s protocol. It is worth noticing that SPW i = h(r i ||PW i ). Now, we further assume that A can obtain the lost or stolen smart card of EVO i after completing the registration process. Hence, A will have all the extracted credentials including r i stored in the smart card of EVO i using the power analysis attacks [25] , [26] 
VI. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section proposes a more secure dynamic privacypreserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT by resolving various security weaknesses of Shen et al.'s protocol (discussed in Section V). The proposed protocol consists of three phases: 1) registration, 2) login and key agreement, and 3) key confirmation and pseudonym update. We also utilize the notations and their significance listed in Table 1 for describing the proposed protocol. To assure resilience against replay attack, current timestamps have been used in the proposed protocol. Thus, the clocks of all involved entities are assumed to be synchronized. This is a typical assumption in the literature, such as the schemes presented in [37] - [43] .
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
EVO i must first register with the TTP to access V2G services. Figure 6 shows the proposed protocol's registration process with detailed procedures as follows.
Step 1: EVO i chooses identity ID i , password PW i , and FPA i ; and then imprints biometrics BIO i , such as fingerprint, iris, palmprint, etc. 
In addition, the smart card also deletes other information x i and s i from its memory.
B. LOGIN AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
The registered EVO i can freely access V2G services using the smart card and biometrics as shown in Figure 7 , with the detailed procedures as follows.
Step 1: EVO i inserts the smart card and imprints biometrics BIO i into a terminal or onboard unit in EV i , and then inputs its ID i and PW i .
Step 2: The smart card calculates Rep(BIO i , τ i ) = b i provided that the Hamming distance between the registered biometrics and current biometrics does not exceed the pre-defined error tolerance threshold value et, After finishing this phase, EV i performs key confirmation and pseudonym update to ensure user privacy and session key security. Thus, mutual authentication between EV i and AGT occurs in the proposed protocol, and both EV i and AGT share the same session key Skey i (= Skey a ).
C. KEY CONFIRMATION AND PSEUDONYM UPDATE PHASE
This process updates EV i 's pseudonymous identity PID i and secret parameter s i to ensure user privacy and resist various attacks. This process also guarantees session key and transmitted message security. Figure 8 shows the proposed confirmation and pseudonym update process with detailed procedures as follows.
Step 
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the proposed protocol security using ''formal security analysis through the widely-accepted Real-or-Random (ROR) model'' [46] . Furthermore, ''mutual authentication proof is carried out with the help of the broadly-accepted Burrow-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic'' [23] and the ''formal security verification using the widely-accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)'' tool. In addition, the informal (non-mathematical) security analysis also reveals that the proposed protocol is secure against other various attacks.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS THROUGH REAL-OR-RANDOM MODEL
The ROR model [46] is applied in order to prove the semantic security of the proposed protocol. Using the ROR model, we prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the ''session key security (SK-security)''. We now discuss shortly the ROR model before proving the SK-security of the proposed protocol in Theorem 1. Under the ROR model, an adversary, say A interacts with the t th instance of an executing participant, say P t . In the proposed protocol, EV i , TTP or AGT is considered as P t . Let P Table 2 . In addition, a ''collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash function h(·) is modeled as a random oracle, say Hash'', which is also available to all the communicating participants including the adversary A.
Wang et al. [47] discovered that ''the user-chosen passwords follow the Zipf's law that is a vastly different distribution from the uniform distribution''. Also, ''the size of password dictionary is generally much constrained in the sense that the users will not use the whole space of passwords, but rather a small space of the allowed characters space'' [47] . The Zipf's law is applied in the formal security analysis to prove the SK security of the proposed protocol.
In the following, we prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the SK-security.
Theorem 1: If Adv AKM
A is the advantage function of an adversary A in breaking the SK-security of the proposed authenticated key-management (AKM) protocol, q h , q s and |Hash| are ''the number of Hash queries, the number of Send queries and the range space of the hash function h(·)'', respectively, l b is the number of bits present in the EVO i 's biometric secret key b i , and C and s denote the Zipf's parameters [47] , then
The similar proof as applied in [38] , [43] , [48] , [49] is followed here. We define the four games, namely G j , j ∈ [0, 3] in which an event is also defined wherein ''A can guess the random bit c in the G j correctly'' and its success probability is defined by Succ G j A . In addition, the ''advantage of A in winning the game G j '' is denoted and defined by Adv AKE
Next, we provide the details of the above defined games G j , j ∈ [0, 3] below.
• Game G 0 : This game corresponds to the ''actual attack executed by A against our proposed protocol in the ROR model'' with respect to the game G 0 . As the bit c is selected randomly at the beginning of G 0 , we get,
• 
• Game G 3 : It is the final game where the adversary A makes execution of the CorruptSC query. Thus, A will have the credentials Table 2 ''. Also, the probability of guessing the biometric key b i of l b bits by the adversary A is approximately 1 2 l b [50] . It is worth noting that the games G 2 and G 3 are identical when the password/biometrics guessing attacks are not present. Hence, using the Zipf's 
where C and s are the Zipf's parameters [47] As all the games are executed, A needs to guess the correct bit c. It follows that
Eqs. (1), (2) and (5), we have the following result:
The triangular inequality and Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) lead to the following result:
Finally, multiplying both sides of Eq. (7) by a factor of 2, we have required result:
B. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
We perform the BAN logic analysis to verify secure mutual authentication for the proposed protocol. Table 3 defines BAN logic postulates and notations, and we detail the goals, assumptions, and idealized forms before performing the BAN logic analysis confirming secure mutual authentication for the proposed protocol. VOLUME 7, 2019
1) BAN LOGIC POSTULATES
The BAN logic postulates are given below.
• Message meaning rule:
• Nonce verification rule:
• Freshness rule:
• Belief rule:
2) GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We make the following goals (G 1 -G 4 ) and assumptions (A 1 -A 8 ) to analyze the proposed protocol security.
AGT |≡ #(t 3 )
AGT |≡ EV i |⇒ (Skey)
EV i |≡ AGT |⇒ (Skey)
3) IDEALIZED FORMS
The idealized forms are as follows.
4) BAN LOGIC PROOF
We employed BAN logic analysis to check that the proposed protocol achieves secure mutual authentication.
Step 1: We can obtain S 1 from M 1 :
Step 2: We can obtain S 2 from the message meaning rule with S 1 and A 1 :
Step 3: We can obtain S 3 from the freshness rule with A 2 :
Step 4: We can obtain S 4 from the nonce verification rule with S 2 and S 3 :
Step 5: We can obtain S 5 from M 2 :
Step 6: We can obtain S 6 from the message meaning rule with S 5 and A 3 :
Step 7: We can obtain S 7 from the freshness rule with A 4 :
Step 8: We can obtain S 8 from the nonce verification rule with S 6 and S 7 :
Step 9: We can obtain S 9 from M 3 :
Step 10: We can obtain S 10 from the message meaning rule with S 9 and A 1 :
Step 11: We can obtain S 11 from the freshness rule with A 5 :
Step 12 : We can obtain S 12 from the nonce verification rule with S 10 and S 11 :
Step 13 : We can obtain S 13 from the belief rule with S 12 : Step 14 : We can obtain S 14 from the jurisdiction rule with S 13 and A 6 :
Step 15: We can obtain S 15 from M 4 :
Step 16: We can obtain S 16 from the message meaning rule with S 15 and A 7 :
Step 17 : We can obtain S 17 from the freshness rule with A 7 :
Step 18: We can obtain S 18 from the nonce verification rule with S 16 and S 17 :
Step 19 : We can obtain S 19 from the belief rule with S 18 : Step 20: Finally, we can obtain S 20 from the jurisdiction rule with S 19 and A 8 :
Thus, the goals (G 1 -G 4 ) prove that the proposed protocol ensures secure mutual authentication between EV i and AGT .
C. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL: SIMULATION STUDY
This section implements simulations to evaluate the proposed protocol security using AVISPA [52] , a widely adopted security analysis model, and prove that the protocol prevents replay and man-in-the-middle attacks [53] - [57] . The AVISPA tool checks if protocols are safe using High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [58] , which has four backends: ''On-the-fly ModelChecker (OMFC), Constraint Logic-based Attack Searcher (CLAtSE), SAT-based Model Checker (SATMC), and Tree automata based on Automatic Approximations for Analysis of Security Protocol (TA4SP)''. First, the HLPSL code is changed from the ''Intermediate Format (IF)'' and input to one of backends, and then IF is changed from the ''Output format (OF)'', which precisely presents security analysis results. Detailed information regarding HLPLS and AVISPA structure can be found elsewhere [52] .
We included three basic roles in the AVISPA implementation for the proposed protocol: EV , TTP, and AGT ; with two composition roles: goal & environment and session, representing participants and environment conditions, respectively, with detailed roles as shown in Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 12 , respectively. Figure 13 shows AVISPA analysis results under OFMC and CL-AtSE backends. OMFC and CL-AtSE prove that a legal entity can successfully perform the protocol by checking for a passive attacker. They also show that the protocol can prevent man-in-the-middle and replay attacks under the DY model. The OFMC backend took 1.29s search time with 130 visited nodes. The CL-AtSE backend analyzed three states in 0.09s translation time. Thus, the OFMC and CL-AtSE checks ensure the proposed protocol is secure against man-in-themiddle and replay attacks.
D. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
We demonstrate that the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks, including impersonation, offline password guessing, man-in-the-middle, and trace attacks. We also show that the proposed protocol achieves anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and secure mutual authentication and key agreement, based on the threat model defined in Section II-A. 
1) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
We assume an attacker U at can obtain the smart card of a legitimate user EVO i and intercept messages transmitted in a session, and then try to impersonate EVO i . However, U at cannot generate the login request {PID i , Ver i , MK i , t 1 } and key confirmation request {PID i , U i , t 3 } messages by generating current timestamps t 1 and t 3 , because U at would need to know secret parameters s i , x i and k i , and session key Skey i . Therefore, the proposed protocol prevents impersonation attack as U at cannot correctly generate request messages.
2) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
The proposed protocol prevents U at from obtaining private parameters, including the password, because
are masked with a random secret number and secret parameters ID i , PW i and b i . Therefore, U at cannot guess EV i 's password correctly as he/she needs to guess ID i and b i simultaneously, which is computationally expensive task for the adversary U at as explained in the threat model in Section II-A.
It is worth noting that three factors used in the proposed protocol are the smart card V i , password PW i and biometric BIO i of a legal registered user U i . For achieving the three-factor security, we assume that if two factors are compromised, U at can not compromise (guess) third factor in the proposed protocol. For this purpose, assume that V i and PW i are compromised by U at . Using the power analysis attacks (explained in the threat model in Section II-A) U at will have the extracted information Rep(·) , et} from the memory of V i , where (= Skey i ) . Thus, the proposed protocol prevents man-in-the-middle attack.
4) REPLAY ATTACK
The proposed protocol prevents replay attack because all transmitted parameters are changed in every session. EV i and AGT also check for valid timestamps using the conditions Ver = AuthVer i . Thus, the proposed protocol identifies and discards previous messages, forbidding replay attacks.
5) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
Suppose a privileged-insider user of the TTP, being an insider adversary A, knows the registration information {SPW i , FPA i , PID i } of a legal user EVO i during the registration process of the proposed protocol. Later, assume that A has lost or stolen smart card V i of the same EVO i after the registration process is done. Hence, using the power analysis attacks, A can extract all the stored information Rep(·) , et} from the lost or stolen smart card V i . However, without having the biometric secret key b i of EVO i , it is ''computationally expensive'' to guess correctly the password PW i of EVO i and then to validate it using SPW i . Also, deriving secret credentials x i and s i is ''computationally infeasible'' as A requires to guess correctly ID i , PW i and b i . As a result, the proposed protocol prevents privileged-insider attack.
6) DESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
In the key confirmation and pseudonym update phase of our protocol, we assume that the smart card V i does not receive the response message {S 1 , S 2 , Auth i , t 4 } from AGT because of unexpected termination or malicious attacks. However, an adversary cannot perform the desychronization attack because the protocol checks whether Auth 
7) EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE (ESL) ATTACK
In the proposed protocol, EV i and AGT establish the common session key as Skey a = h(k a ||k i ||s i ) = h(k * a ||k i ||s * i ) = Skey i . The session key is now dependent on both the ''sessiontemporary (ephemeral or short term) secrets'' k i and k a , and the long-term secret s i . We consider the following two cases here:
• Case 1. Even if the ''short term secrets k i and k a '' are compromised through compromise of session states according to the CK-adversary model discussed in the threat model (Section II-A) to an adversary A, it is ''computationally difficult problem to derive the session key without the long-term secret s i ''.
• Case 2. Even if the ''long term secret s i '' is somehow compromised to A, it is also ''computationally difficult problem to derive the session key without the short-term secrets k i and k a ''.
Therefore, from the above two cases it is clear that the session key is only calculated if A can compromise both short & long term secret credentials. Since the session keys between any EV i and AGT are distinct and unique, ''a secret key leakage to A in a session does not lead to calculate other session keys in other sessions and it is also computationally infeasible problem due to application of both short & long term secrets in the session keys''. Hence, the ''session-temporary information attack is protected in the proposed protocol''. Thus, the proposed protocol prevents ''ESL attack''.
8) TRACE ATTACK AND ANONYMITY
Sections VI-B and VI-C show that all transmitted messages 
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed protocol with regard to security & functionality features and computational cost, and then compares the outcomes with related protocols [18] , [19] , [22] .
A. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY FEATURES COMPARISON
We compare the security & functionality features of the proposed protocol with related protocols [18] , [19] , [22] as shown in Table 4 . All previously proposed protocols cannot prevent various attacks, and also cannot guarantee perfect forward secrecy and secure mutual authentication. Thus, the proposed protocol provides superior security security & functionality features as compared with previous protocols.
B. COMPUTATIONAL COSTS COMPARISON
We compare computational overheads with related protocols [18] , [19] , [22] as shown in Table 5 during the VOLUME 7, 2019 The bitwise XOR operation is not included in this analysis because it is negligible as compared to other operations (T m , T ecc , T fe , and T h ). Table 5 shows that the proposed protocol requires T fe + 11T h for each user (e.g., EV i ) and 5T h for the server (e.g., AGT ). This is a higher computational cost of the proposed protocol than Shen et al.'s protocol, but the proposed protocol guarantees significantly better improved security and functionality features. Thus, the proposed protocol is more secure than comparable previous protocols and can be applied to practical V2G environments.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper showed that Shen et al.'s protocol does not prevent impersonation, offline password guessing and privileged-insider attacks, and it does not ensure secure mutual authentication and perfect forward security. Consequently, we proposed a more secure dynamic privacy-preserving and lightweight key agreement protocol for V2G in SIoT to overcome the identified security flaws in Shen et al.'s protocol. The proposed protocol prevents impersonation, offline guessing, man-in-the-middle, replay, and trace attacks while also achieving perfect forward secrecy, anonymity, and secure mutual authentication because all transmitted parameters are dynamic in each session. We employed the BAN logic to prove that the proposed protocol provides secure mutual authentication between EV i and AGT , the formal security analysis using the ROR model to prove that the proposed protocol provides the SK-security, and also implemented formal security verification simulation study using the AVISPA tool to demonstrate it was secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, through the informal security analysis, we also showed that the proposed protocol can prevent other potential attacks. Furthermore, we performed the performance analysis of our protocol with related protocols. The proposed protocol was shown to be secure and more suitable for application to practical V2G systems. 
